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Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.Abstract. In an inﬁnite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that any social
welfare function satisfying Arrow’s axioms and stationarity must be a dictatorship of the
ﬁrst generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule
generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and
stationarity. We prove that this impossibility survives under a domain restriction and
without completeness. We propose a more suitable stationarity axiom and show that
a social welfare function on a speciﬁc domain satisﬁes this modiﬁed version and some
standard social choice axioms if and only if it is a chronological dictatorship. Journal of
Economic Literature Classiﬁcation No.: D71.
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icographic Dictatorships.1 Introduction
As is well-known, the validity of Arrow’s celebrated general impossibility theorem (Arrow,
1951; 1963) hinges squarely on the ﬁniteness of population. Fishburn (1970), Sen (1979)
and Suzumura (2000) presented their respective method of proving Arrow’s theorem and
highlighted the crucial role played by the assumption that the population is ﬁnite. Kir-
man and Sondermann (1972) and Hansson (1976) cast a new light on the structure of
an Arrovian social welfare function with an inﬁnite population, revealing the structure of
decisive coalitions for such a function as an ultraﬁlter. In their analysis, however, there
was no explicit consideration of a sequential relationship among the members of an inﬁnite
population. It was a pioneering analysis due to Ferejohn and Page (1978) that introduced
time explicitly. Time ﬂows only unidirectionally, and two members t and t0 of the society,
to be called generation t and generation t0, are such that generation t0 appears in the
society after generation t if and only if t is smaller than t0. As a result of introducing
this time structure of inﬁnite population, Ferejohn and Page (1978) also opened a new
gate towards combining Arrovian social choice theory and the theory of evaluating inﬁnite
intergenerational utility streams, which was initiated by Koopmans (1960) and Diamond
(1965). In the traditional Koopmans-Diamond framework, the focus is on resource allo-
cations among diﬀerent generations with ﬁxed utility functions, one for each generation.
Thus, multi-proﬁle considerations do not arise. This paper is an attempt to reexamine the
Ferejohn-Page analysis of intergenerational social choice theory in a multi-proﬁle setting.
Starting out with Hansson’s (1976) result on the ultraﬁlter structure of the set of deci-
sive coalitions, Ferejohn and Page (1978) proposed a stationarity condition in an inﬁnite-
horizon multi-proﬁle social choice model and showed that if a social welfare function
satisfying Arrow’s conditions and stationarity exists, generation one must be a dictator.
Stationarity as deﬁned by Ferejohn and Page demands that if a common ﬁrst-period alter-
native is eliminated from two inﬁnite streams of per-period alternatives, then the resulting
continuation streams must be ranked in the same way as the original streams according to
the social ranking obtained for the original proﬁle. The reason why generation one is the
only candidate for a dictator is the unidirectional nature of the ﬂow of time—and, thus,
the unequal treatment of generations in the stationarity property. Dictatorships of later
generations fail to satisfy stationarity because we cannot reassess our social evaluation
after a later period has passed but an earlier period is still present: we can only move
forward but not backward in time.
As Ferejohn and Page (1978) noted themselves, the question whether such a social
1welfare function exists at all was left open by their analysis; what they showed was that
if a function with the required properties exists, it must be dictatorial with generation
one being the dictator. Packel (1980) answered the question Ferejohn and Page left open
by establishing a strong impossibility result: even without independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives and without assuming social preferences to be transitive, no collective choice
rule can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. Note that Packel (1980)
operates within the same framework as Ferejohn and Page (1978) to establish the impos-
sibility. Thus, his result is not an observation in a diﬀerent setting but, rather, an answer
to the question left open by Ferejohn and Page (1978).
In this paper, we ﬁrst prove that the negative implications of the Ferejohn-Page sta-
tionarity condition are actually more far-reaching: even without reﬂexivity and complete-
ness, there exists no collective choice rule that satisﬁes unlimited domain, weak Pareto
and stationarity. The same conclusion holds if individual preferences are restricted to
those that are history-independent. No restrictions whatsoever are imposed on social
preferences—they need not be reﬂexive, complete or transitive. By dropping reﬂexivity
and completeness, we strengthen Packel’s impossibility result substantially. It will be-
come clear once we establish the proof of this impossibility why all collective choice rules
(including dictatorships) fail to satisfy the required axioms.
Packel’s (1980) approach to resolve the impossibility consisted of restricting the domain
of a social welfare function to proﬁles where generation one’s preferences are themselves
stationary. This allowed him to obtain possibility results in that setting. In contrast,
we think that the natural way to formulate a domain restriction in the intertemporal
context is to assume that the preferences of each generation are restricted to depend on
the outcome for this generation only. In that case, there do exist social welfare functions
that satisfy weak Pareto and stationarity but all of them violate Pareto indiﬀerence.
We conclude that the version of stationarity employed by Ferejohn and Page (1978)
and by Packel (1980) is too demanding and has some counter-intuitive features. In re-
sponse, we propose what we suggest is a more suitable multi-proﬁle version of stationarity.
Our multi-proﬁle stationarity property requires that, for any two streams of per-period
alternatives and for any preference proﬁle, if the ﬁrst-period alternatives are the same in
the two streams, then the social ranking of the two streams according to this proﬁle is the
same as the social ranking that results if the common ﬁrst-period alternative is removed
along with the preference ordering of generation one. Note that there is an essential dif-
ference between the Ferejohn and Page (1978) and Packel (1980) version of stationarity
and our multi-proﬁle version. Ferejohn and Page (1978) and Packel (1980) continue to
2apply the original proﬁle (including the preference ordering of generation one) even after
a common ﬁrst-period alternative has been removed. In contrast, our version is, in our
opinion, more coherent because it applies to situations in which the preference ordering
of the ﬁrst generation is eliminated as well as the common period-one alternative.
Our main result uses multi-proﬁle stationarity to characterize the lexicographic dicta-
torship in which the generations are taken into consideration in chronological order. The
main conclusion is that, although the inﬁnite-population version of Arrow’s social choice
problem permits, in principle, non-dictatorial rules, these additional possibilities all but
vanish if multi-proﬁle stationarity is imposed.
2 Inﬁnite-Horizon Social Choice
Suppose there is a set of per-period alternatives X containing at least three elements, that
is, |X|≥3 where |X| denotes the cardinality of X. These per-period alternatives could
be consumption bundles, for example, but we do not restrict attention to one particular
interpretation. Let X∞ be the set of all inﬁnite streams of per-period alternatives x =
(x1,x 2,...) where, for each generation t ∈ N, xt ∈ X is the period-t alternative experienced
by generation t.
The set of all binary relations on X∞ is denoted by B, and C is the set of all complete
relations on X∞. Furthermore, the set of all orderings on X∞ is denoted by R, where an
ordering is a reﬂexive, complete and transitive relation. A social relation is an element
R of B. We assume that each generation t ∈ N has an ordering Rt ∈R . A (preference)
proﬁle is a stream R =( R1,R 2,...) of orderings on X∞. The set of all such proﬁles is
denoted by R∞.
Let t ∈ N.F o rx ∈ X∞, we deﬁne the period-t continuation of x as
x≥t =( xt,x t+1,...)
and, analogously, for R ∈R ∞, the period-t continuation of R as
R≥t =( Rt,R t+1,...).
Clearly, x≥t is an element of X∞ for any t ∈ N and for any x ∈ X∞. This is the case
because we can deﬁne ˆ xτ = xτ+t−1 for all τ ∈ N, which immediately implies that
ˆ x =( ˆ x1, ˆ x2,...)=( xt,x t+1,...)=x≥t
3is a well-deﬁned element of X∞. The same reasoning applies to preference proﬁles: any
period-t continuation R≥t of a proﬁle R ∈R ∞ is itself an element of R∞.
The above deﬁnition of continuations of streams of per-period alternatives is that
used by Ferejohn and Page (1978) and Packel (1980). Both Ferejohn and Page and
Packel adopt an ‘absolute’ notion of time: Ferejohn and Page (1978, p.272) interpret x≥2
and y≥2 as the streams that are obtained if x and y are “shifted forward one period”
and Packel (1980, p.220) assumes that if (x1,x 2,x 3,...) is an admissible stream, then
so is (x2,x 3,...), saying that “if a certain overall intergenerational program is possible,
then moving the program up one generation is also possible.” We follow these authors in
adopting this absolute interpretation but note that, due to the observation following the
above deﬁnition of continuation streams, requiring all streams of per-period alternatives
and of preferences to be indexed by all positive integers (thus adopting a ‘relative’ notion
of time) would not change our domains and, thus, our results would be unaﬀected by
such a move. What is crucial, however, is the way we combine continuation streams of
alternatives and of preferences when deﬁning notions of stationarity. It turns out that the
formulation employed by Ferejohn and Page and by Packel is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
ours in this respect, as will become clear in the next two sections.
Two subsets of the unlimited domain R∞ are of importance in this paper. We deﬁne
the forward-looking domain R∞
F by letting, for all R ∈R ∞, R ∈R ∞
F if and only if, for
each t ∈ N, there exists an ordering Qt on X∞ such that, for all x,y ∈ X∞,
xRty ⇔ x≥tQty≥t.
Analogously, the selﬁsh domain R∞
S is obtained by letting, for all R ∈R ∞, R ∈R ∞
S if
and only if, for each t ∈ N, there exists an ordering ￿t on X such that, for all x,y ∈ X∞,
xRty ⇔ xt ￿t yt.
Clearly, we have R∞
S ⊆R ∞
F ⊆R ∞. The relation Rt is an ordering on the set of streams
X∞, whereas ￿t is an ordering on the set of per-period alternatives X. On selﬁsh domains,
the two can be used interchangeably because, by deﬁnition, each generation only cares
about its own per-period alternatives. Note that the deﬁnition of selﬁsh preferences by
itself does not prevent social preferences from, for example, using ￿1 to compare per-
period alternatives such as xt and yt for periods t that are diﬀerent from period one. This
observation justiﬁes the use of the example following the statement of Theorem 1.
For a relation R ∈B , the asymmetric part P(R)o fR is deﬁned by
xP(R)y ⇔ [xRy and ¬yRx]
4for all x,y ∈ X∞. The symmetric part I(R)o fR is deﬁned by
xI(R)y ⇔ [xRy and yRx]
for all x,y ∈ X∞. Furthermore, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈B , R|{x,y} is the
restriction of R to the set {x,y}.
In the inﬁnite-horizon context studied in this paper, a collective choice rule is a map-
ping f:D→B , where D⊆R ∞ with D6 = ∅ is the domain of f. The interpretation is
that, for a proﬁle R ∈D , f(R) is the social ranking of streams in X∞.I ff(D) ⊆C , f is
a complete collective choice rule. If f(D) ⊆R , f is a social welfare function.
Arrow (1951; 1963) imposed the axioms of unlimited domain, weak Pareto and inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives and showed that, in the case of a ﬁnite population,
the resulting social welfare functions are dictatorial: there exists an individual such that,
whenever this individual strictly prefers one alternative over another, this strict prefer-
ence is reproduced in the social ranking, irrespective of the preferences of other members
of society. This result is quite robust with respect to the domain considered. For ex-
ample, replacing unlimited domain with various alternative domain assumptions (such
as the free-triple assumption and others that apply to economic environments) preserves
Arrow’s impossibility result. In this paper, it turns out that a speciﬁc domain restric-
tion (particularly, the selﬁsh domain assumption deﬁned below) allows us to circumvent
impossibilities.
The axioms relevant in our context are deﬁned as follows.
Unlimited domain. D = R∞.
Forward-looking domain. D = R∞
F .
Selﬁsh domain. D = R∞
S .
Weak Pareto. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈D ,
xP(Rt)y ∀t ∈ N ⇒ xP(f(R))y.
Pareto indiﬀerence. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈D ,
xI(Rt)y ∀t ∈ N ⇒ xI(f(R))y.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R,R0 ∈D ,
Rt|{x,y} = R
0
t|{x,y} ∀t ∈ N ⇒ f(R)|{x,y} = f(R
0)|{x,y} .
5Let f:D→Rbe a social welfare function and let x,y ∈ X∞. A set T ⊆ N (also
referred to as a coalition)i sdecisive for x over y for f if and only if, for all R ∈D ,
xP(Rt)y ∀t ∈ T ⇒ xP(f(R))y.
Furthermore, a set T ⊆ N is decisive for f if and only if T is decisive for x over y for f
for all x,y ∈ X∞. Clearly, N is decisive for any social welfare function f that satisﬁes
weak Pareto. If there is a generation t ∈ N such that {t} is decisive for f, generation t is
a dictator for f.
Hansson (1976) has shown that if a social welfare function f satisﬁes unlimited do-
main, weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then the set of all decisive
coalitions for f must be an ultraﬁlter. An ultraﬁlter on N is a collection U of subsets of
N such that
1. ∅6 ∈U;
2. ∀T ⊆ N,[ T ∈U or N \ T ∈U];
3. ∀T,T0 ∈U, T ∩ T 0 ∈U.
The conjunction of properties 1 and 2 implies that N ∈Uand, furthermore, the conjunc-
tion of properties 1 and 3 implies that the disjunction in property 2 is exclusive—that is,
T and N \ T cannot both be in U.
An ultraﬁlter U is principal if and only if there exists a t ∈ N such that, for all
T ⊆ N, T ∈Uif and only if t ∈ T. Otherwise, U is a free ultraﬁlter. It can be veriﬁed
easily that if N is replaced with a ﬁnite set, then the only ultraﬁlters are principal and,
therefore, Hansson’s theorem reformulated for ﬁnite populations reduces to Arrow’s (1951;
1963) theorem—that is, there exists an individual (or a generation) t which is a dictator.
In the inﬁnite-population case, a set of decisive coalitions that is a principal ultraﬁlter
corresponds to a dictatorship just as in the ﬁnite case. Unlike in the ﬁnite case, there also
exist free ultraﬁlters but they cannot be deﬁned explicitly; the proof of their existence
relies on non-constructive methods in the sense of using variants of the axiom of choice.
These free ultraﬁlters are non-dictatorial. However, social preferences associated with sets
of decisive coalitions that form free ultraﬁlters fail to be continuous with respect to most
standard topologies; see, for instance, Campbell (1990; 1992a,b).
63 Stationarity
None of the above-deﬁned axioms invoke the intertemporal structure imposed by our
intergenerational interpretation. In contrast, the following stationarity property proposed
by Ferejohn and Page (1978) is based on the unidirectional nature of time. The intuition
underlying stationarity is that if two streams of per-period alternatives agree in the ﬁrst
period, their relative social ranking is the same as that of their respective period-two
continuations. To formulate a property of this nature in a multi-proﬁle setting, the proﬁle
under consideration for each of the two comparisons must be speciﬁed. In Ferejohn and
Page’s (1978) and Packel’s (1980) contributions, the same proﬁle is employed before and
after the common ﬁrst-period alternative is removed. It seems to us that this leads to a
rather demanding requirement because the preferences of the ﬁrst generation continue to
be taken into consideration even though the alternatives relevant for this generation have
been eliminated. Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) stationarity axiom, the underlying idea of
which is due originally to Koopmans (1960) in a related but distinct context, is deﬁned
as follows.
Stationarity. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈D ,i fx1 = y1, then
xf(R)y ⇔ x≥2f(R)y≥2.
Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) result establishes that if there exists a social welfare
function f that satisﬁes unlimited domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives and stationarity, then f must be such that generation one is a dictator for
f. The existence issue itself remained unresolved by their analysis, as they clearly ac-
knowledge. It was Packel (1980, Theorem 1) who answered this open question in the
negative by showing that there does not exist any complete collective choice rule that
satisﬁes unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. Neither transitivity nor inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives are needed to establish this impossibility result. That
even dictatorships do not work under the unlimited domain assumption can be seen by
examining the proof of our strengthening of Packel’s (1980) impossibility result reported
in the following theorem; in fact, our proof is modeled after Packel’s own proof, but it uses
fewer assumptions to establish the impossibility. We show that, in addition to transitiv-
ity, reﬂexivity and completeness can be dropped and, moreover, the impossibility persists
even on the forward-looking domain. Note that, however, the result is not true under the
selﬁsh domain, as we establish with an example after proving the theorem.
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weak Pareto and stationarity.
Proof. Suppose f is a collective choice rule that satisﬁes the axioms of the theorem
statement. Let x,y ∈ X and let, for each generation t, ￿t be an antisymmetric ordering
on X such that yP(￿t)x for all odd t and xP(￿t)y for all even t. Deﬁne a forward-looking
proﬁle R as follows. For all x,y ∈ X∞, let
xP(R1)y ⇔ x1P(￿1)y1 or [x1 = y1 and x3P(￿1)y3].
Now let, for all x,y ∈ X∞, xR1y if and only if ¬yP(R1)x. For all t ∈ N\{1} and for all
x,y ∈ X∞, let
xRty ⇔ xt ￿t yt.
Clearly, the proﬁle thus deﬁned is in R∞
F . Now consider the streams
x =( x,y,x,y,x,y,... )=( x,y);
y =( y,x,y,x,y,x,... );
z =( x,x,y,x,y,x,...)=( x,x).
Thus, x≥2 = y and z≥2 = x.W e h a v e zP(Rt)x for all t ∈ N and, by weak Pareto,
zP(f(R))x. Stationarity implies xP(f(R))y. But yP(Rt)x for all t ∈ N, and we obtain
a contradiction to weak Pareto.
Clearly, replacing forward-looking domain with unlimited domain does not aﬀect the
validity of the above theorem. Furthermore, there is but a single proﬁle used in the proof
and, thus, the conclusion of Theorem 1 is preserved by domain expansion; this is not
always the case for results in the spirit of Arrow’s (1951; 1963) fundamental theorem.
The impossibility can be resolved by replacing forward-looking domain with selﬁsh
domain. To construct an explicit example, consider any selﬁsh proﬁle R ∈R ∞
S . Recall
that, by deﬁnition of selﬁsh domain, the proﬁle R of individual orderings deﬁned on the
set X∞ of streams of per-period alternatives is in R∞
S if and only if, for each t ∈ N, there
exists an ordering ￿t deﬁned on the set X of per-period alternatives such that the relative
ranking of two streams x and y in X∞ according to Rt is identical to the relative ranking of
the period-t alternatives xt and yt according to ￿t. Thus, the selﬁsh proﬁle R of orderings
deﬁned on X∞ is completely speciﬁed once the proﬁle (￿1,￿2,...) consisting of orderings
on X is speciﬁed. Suppose (￿1,￿2,...) is the proﬁle of orderings on X associated with
8the selﬁsh proﬁle R ∈R ∞
S of orderings on X∞. We now deﬁne a social welfare function
f by letting, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈R ∞
S , xf(R)y if and only if
[xτI(￿1)yτ ∀ τ ∈ N]o r[ ∃t ∈ N such that [xτI(￿1)yτ ∀τ<t and xtP(￿1)yt]]
The social welfare function f satisﬁes selﬁsh domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. How-
ever, it does not satisfy Pareto indiﬀerence. Intuitively, this is the case because, at the
social level, generation one’s per-period preferences are consulted not only in period one
but also in later periods, whereas the per-period preferences of other generations do not
inﬂuence the social comparisons at all. More generally, replacing forward-looking do-
main with selﬁsh domain and adding Pareto indiﬀerence in Theorem 1 produces another
impossibility.
Theorem 2 There exists no collective choice rule that satisﬁes selﬁsh domain, weak
Pareto, Pareto indiﬀerence and stationarity.
Proof. Suppose f is a collective choice rule that satisﬁes the axioms of the theorem
statement. Let x,y,z ∈ X and let, for each generation t ∈ N, ￿t be an ordering on X
such that zP(￿t)xI(￿t)y for all odd t and zI(￿t)xP(￿t)y for all even t. Deﬁne a proﬁle
R as follows. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all t ∈ N, let
xRty ⇔ xt ￿t yt.
Clearly, the proﬁle thus deﬁned is in R∞
S . Now consider the streams
x =( z,x,z,x,z,x,...);
y =( x,y,x,y,x,y,... );
z =( z,z,x,z,x,z,x,...)=( z,x);
w =( z,x,y,x,y,x,y,... )=( z,y).
Thus, z≥2 = x and w≥2 = y.W eh a v ezI(Rt)w for all t ∈ N and, by Pareto indiﬀerence,
zI(f(R))w. Stationarity implies xI(f(R))y. But xP(Rt)y for all t ∈ N, and we obtain
a contradiction to weak Pareto.
Packel’s (1980) response to his impossibility result consisted of restricting the domain
to proﬁles that only contain generation-one preferences that are themselves stationary,
thus ruling out the type of proﬁle that he used in his impossibility theorem (and that we
use in our Theorem 1). In contrast, we think that the selﬁsh domain represents a plausible
9restriction of preferences in an intergenerational setting, and we therefore propose to
amend Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) stationarity condition in order to allow for possibility
results. One shortcoming we see with stationarity as deﬁned in this section is that it
applies to period-two continuations of streams in which common period-one alternatives
are eliminated, whereas the original proﬁle is retained even though the alternatives relevant
for generation one are not present in the continuations. The alternative variant that we
introduce in the following section does not suﬀer from this problem.
4 Multi-Proﬁle Stationarity
In Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) stationarity axiom, the same proﬁle R is applied both
before and after the common period-one alternative is eliminated. This seems to us to
be rather counter-intuitive and, consequently, we propose the following version that takes
this point into consideration by eliminating the (common) ﬁrst-period component not
only from the streams but also from the proﬁle. When combined with selﬁsh domain, this
appears to be a natural version of the axiom.
Multi-proﬁle stationarity. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈D ,i fx1 = y1, then
xf(R)y ⇔ x≥2f(R≥2)y≥2.
Note that the continuation proﬁle R≥2 is only used in comparing the continuation streams
x≥2 and y≥2 in the deﬁnition of multi-proﬁle stationarity. Thus, there is no conﬂict with
the selﬁsh domain assumption.
We now examine the implications of our multi-proﬁle stationarity axiom. In particular,
it allows us to characterize the chronological dictatorship. This variant of a lexicographic
dictatorship consults generation one ﬁrst but, in the case of its indiﬀerence, moves on
to consult generation two regarding the ranking of two streams, and so on. Thus, there
still is a strong dictatorship component but it is not as extreme as that generated by
stationarity—and it is compatible with Pareto indiﬀerence. Moreover, the chronological
dictatorship is a social welfare function and not merely a collective choice rule.
The chronological dictatorship fCD is deﬁned as follows (again, recall that the order-
ings ￿t on X are suﬃcient to identify the corresponding selﬁsh orderings Rt on X∞). For
all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈R ∞
S , xfCD(R)y if and only if
[xτI(￿τ)yτ ∀ τ ∈ N]o r[ ∃t ∈ N such that [xτI(￿τ)yτ ∀τ<t and xtP(￿t)yt]].
10In order to prove a version of Hansson’s (1976) theorem that applies to the selﬁsh
domain, we require Pareto indiﬀerence as an additional axiom. A modiﬁcation of this
nature is required because the selﬁsh domain is not suﬃciently rich to generate arbitrary
rankings of all streams of alternatives. For instance, whenever we have two streams of per-
period alternatives x and y such that xt = yt for some selﬁsh generation t ∈ N, this selﬁsh
generation must declare x and y indiﬀerent: a per-period alternative cannot be strictly
preferred to itself; in fact, indiﬀerence is forced by the conjunction of selﬁsh domain and
reﬂexivity. More precisely, this addition of Pareto indiﬀerence to the list of axioms is
necessitated by the observation that a fundamental preliminary result—an adaptation of
Sen’s (1995, p.4) ﬁeld expansion lemma to our selﬁsh domain setting—fails to be true
if merely selﬁsh domain, weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives are
imposed.
Our version of the ﬁeld expansion lemma is stated below. Because we invoke Pareto
indiﬀerence in addition to the remaining axioms of the statement of the lemma, its proof
varies from that of the standard formulation.
Lemma 1 Let f be a social welfare function that satisﬁes selﬁsh domain, weak Pareto,
Pareto indiﬀerence and independence of irrelevant alternatives, and let T ⊆ N. If there
exist x,y ∈ X∞ such that xt 6= yt for all t ∈ N and T is decisive for x over y for f, then
T is decisive for f.
Proof. Let f be a social welfare function that satisﬁes the axioms of the lemma statement,
and let T ⊆ N. Suppose that x,y ∈ X∞ are such that xt 6= yt for all t ∈ N and that T is
decisive for x over y for f. In order to cover all possible cases, we have to establish that
T is decisive:
(i) for x over z for f for all z ∈ X∞ \{ x,y};
(ii) for z over y for f for all z ∈ X∞ \{ x,y};
(iii) for z over x for f for all z ∈ X∞ \{ x,y};
(iv) for y over z for f for all z ∈ X∞ \{ x,y};
(v) for z over w for all distinct z,w ∈ X∞ \{ x,y};
(vi) for y over x for f.
11First, note that if there exists t ∈ T such that zt = xt (or zt = yt or zt = wt, depending
on which case applies), T is trivially decisive for x over z (or for z over y or for z over x
or for y over z or for z over w, respectively) because, by reﬂexivity and the assumption
that preferences are selﬁsh, we must have that x and z (or z and y or z and w) are
indiﬀerent for any generation t ∈ T such that zt = xt (or zt = yt or zt = wt) and, thus,
the implication deﬁning decisiveness is vacuously satisﬁed for any selﬁsh proﬁle. Thus,
we can suppose that, for all t ∈ N, zt 6= xt in (i) and in (iii), zt 6= yt in (ii) and in (iv),
and zt 6= wt in (v). Furthermore, observe that and xt 6= yt is assumed throughout (and,
in particular, in (vi)) due to the hypothesis of the lemma.





zt if zt 6= yt;
z0
t ∈ X \{ xt,y t} if zt = yt
















t|{x,z0} ∀t ∈ N;
R
00
t|{x,z} = Rt|{x,z} ∀t ∈ N.
Because T is decisive for x over y for f by assumption, we have xP(f(R0))y. By weak
Pareto, yP(f(R0))z0. By transitivity, xP(f(R0))z0. By independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives, xP(f(R00))z0. Pareto indiﬀerence implies z0I(f(R00))z and, by transitivity,
xP(f(R00))z. By independence of irrelevant alternatives, it follows that xP(f(R))z and
that T is decisive for x over z for f.





zt if zt 6= xt;
z0
t ∈ X \{ xt,y t} if zt = xt
















t|{y,z0} ∀t ∈ N;
R
00
t|{y,z} = Rt|{y,z} ∀t ∈ N.
12By weak Pareto, the decisiveness of T for x over y for f, transitivity and independence of
irrelevant alternatives, we obtain z0P(f(R00))y. Applying Pareto indiﬀerence, transitivity
and independence of irrelevant alternatives, it follows that zP(f(R))y and that T is
decisive for z over y for f.





zt if zt 6= yt;
z0
t ∈ X \{ xt,y t} if zt = yt
















t|{x,z0} ∀t ∈ N;
R
00
t|{x,z} = Rt|{x,z} ∀t ∈ N.
By the decisiveness of T for z0 over y for f (see (ii)), weak Pareto, transitivity and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, we obtain z0P(f(R00))x. Pareto indiﬀerence, transitivity
and independence of irrelevant alternatives together imply that zP(f(R))x and that T is
decisive for z over x for f.





zt if zt 6= xt;
z0
t ∈ X \{ xt,y t} if zt = xt
















t|{y,z0} ∀t ∈ N;
R
00
t|{y,z} = Rt|{y,z} ∀t ∈ N.
By weak Pareto, the decisiveness of T for x over z0 for f (see (i)), transitivity and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, we obtain yP(f(R00))z0. Pareto indiﬀerence, transitivity
and independence of irrelevant alternatives together imply that yP(f(R))z and that T is
decisive for y over z for f.





zt if zt 6= xt;
z0
t ∈ X \{ xt,w t} if zt = xt





wt if wt 6= xt;
w0
t ∈ X \{ xt,z t} if wt = xt
for all t ∈ T. Note that, because zt 6= wt for all t ∈ T in this case, xt, z0
t and w0
t are pairwise





















t|{z0,w0} ∀t ∈ N;
R
00
t|{z,w} = Rt|{z,w} ∀t ∈ N.
By the decisiveness of T for z0 over x (see (iii)) and for x over w0 (see (i)) for f, transi-
tivity and independence of irrelevant alternatives, we obtain z0P(f(R00))w0. Now Pareto
indiﬀerence, transitivity and independence of irrelevant alternatives together imply that
zP(f(R))w and that T is decisive for z over w for f.
(vi) Let z ∈ X∞ be such that zt 6∈ {xt,y t} for all t ∈ T. By selﬁsh domain, we can






t)x ∀t ∈ T;
R
0
t|{x,y} = Rt|{x,y} ∀t ∈ N.
By the decisiveness of T for y over z (see (iv)) and for z over x (see (iii)) for f and tran-
sitivity, we obtain yP(f(R0))x. By independence of irrelevant alternatives, yP(f(R))x
and T is decisive for y over x for f.
Our version of Hansson’s (1976) theorem is formulated for the selﬁsh domain. Again,
Pareto indiﬀerence is added so as to be able to apply Lemma 1.
Theorem 3 If a social welfare function f satisﬁes selﬁsh domain, weak Pareto, Pareto
indiﬀerence and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then the set of all decisive coali-
tions for f is an ultraﬁlter on N.
14Proof. Suppose f satisﬁes selﬁsh domain, weak Pareto, Pareto indiﬀerence and indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives. We need to show that the set of all decisive coalitions for
f has the three properties of an ultraﬁlter.
1. If ∅ is decisive for f, we obtain xP(f(R))y and yP(f(R))x for any two alternatives
x,y ∈ X∞ and for any proﬁle R ∈R ∞
S such that all generations are indiﬀerent between
x and y, which is impossible. Thus, ∅ cannot be decisive for f.
2. Let T ⊆ N. Let x,y,z ∈ X∞ be such that xt,y t,z t are pairwise distinct for all t ∈ N.
By selﬁsh domain, we can deﬁne a proﬁle R ∈R ∞
S such that
xP(Rt)y and xP(Rt)z ∀t ∈ T;
xP(Rt)y and zP(Rt)y ∀t ∈ N \ T.
If xP(f(R))z, T is decisive for x over z for f. Lemma 1 implies that T is decisive for
f.
If ¬xP(f(R))z, we have zf(R)x by completeness. Furthermore, xP(f(R))y by weak
Pareto. Transitivity implies zP(f(R))y. Thus, N \ T is decisive for y over z and, by
Lemma 1, N \ T is decisive for f.
3. Suppose T and T 0 are decisive for f. Let x,y,z ∈ X∞ be such that xt,y t,z t are
pairwise distinct for all t ∈ N. By selﬁsh domain, we can deﬁne a proﬁle R ∈R ∞
S such
that
xP(Rt)y and xP(Rt)z ∀t ∈ T \ T
0;
zP(Rt)xP(Rt)y ∀t ∈ T ∩ T
0;
yP(Rt)x and zP(Rt)x ∀t ∈ T
0 \ T.
Because T is decisive for f, we have xP(f(R))y. Because T 0 is decisive for f, we have
zP(f(R))x. By transitivity, zP(f(R))y. This implies that T ∩T 0 is decisive for z over y
for f. By Lemma 1, T ∩ T 0 is decisive for f.
The next step towards our characterization result consists of showing that Ferejohn
and Page’s (1978) dictatorship result is true on a selﬁsh domain when Pareto indiﬀerence
is added and multi-proﬁle stationarity is used instead of stationarity.
Theorem 4 If a social welfare function f satisﬁes selﬁsh domain, weak Pareto, Pareto
indiﬀerence, independence of irrelevant alternatives and multi-proﬁle stationarity, then
generation one is a dictator for f.
15Proof. Suppose f satisﬁes selﬁsh domain, weak Pareto, Pareto indiﬀerence, independence
of irrelevant alternatives and multi-proﬁle stationarity. By Theorem 3, the set of decisive
coalitions for f is an ultraﬁlter on N. Suppose N \{ 1} is decisive for f.
Let x and y be two distinct elements of the set X of per-period alternatives and let
￿ be an ordering on X such that xP(￿)y. By selﬁsh domain, we can deﬁne a proﬁle
R ∈R ∞
S by letting, for all t ∈ N and for all x,y ∈ X∞,
xRty ⇔ xt ￿ yt.
Now consider the streams
x =( x,x,y,x,y,x,... )=( x,y);
y =( x,y,x,y,x,y,... )=( x,z);
z =( y,x,y,x,y,x,... ).
Recall that N \{ 1} is decisive for f.
If {2,4,6,...} is decisive for f,w eh a v exP(f(R))y. By multi-proﬁle stationarity,
y = x≥2P(f(R≥2))y≥2 = z,
contradicting the decisiveness of {2,4,6,....} for f.
If {2,4,6,...} is not decisive for f, property 2 of an ultraﬁlter implies that
N \{ 2,4,6,...} = {1,3,5,... }
is decisive for f. Because, in addition, N\{1} is decisive for f, property 3 of an ultraﬁlter
implies that
{3,5,7,...} = {1,3,5,...}∩(N \{ 1})
is decisive for f. By virtue of the decisiveness of {3,5,7,...} for f, we have yP(f(R))x.
By multi-proﬁle stationarity,
z = y≥2P(f(R≥2))x≥2 = y,
contradicting the decisiveness of {3,5,7,....} for f.
Thus, in all cases, we obtain a contradiction to the assumption that N\{1} is decisive
for f. Therefore, because of property 2 of an ultraﬁlter, {1} is decisive for f and, thus,
generation one is a dictator for f.
The reason that generation one must be the generation that dictates is, again, a
consequence of the unidirectional nature of the ﬂow of time—and, thus, the unequal
16manner in which multi-proﬁle stationarity treats generations. The example constructed
in the above proof involving the streams x, y and z can be used to make this point: just as
we lead the assumption that the coalition {2,4,6,...} is decisive for f to a contradiction
in the relevant step of the proof, the same reasoning leads the assumption that generation
two is a dictator to a contradiction. Clearly, the example is easily amended so as to apply
to any generation other than generation one.
The ﬁnal result of this paper characterizes fCD.
Theorem 5 A social welfare function f satisﬁes selﬁsh domain, weak Pareto, Pareto
indiﬀerence, independence of irrelevant alternatives and multi-proﬁle stationarity if and
only if f = fCD.
Proof. That fCD satisﬁes the axioms can be veriﬁed by the reader. To prove the converse
implication, suppose f satisﬁes the required axioms. It is suﬃcient to show that, for all
x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈R ∞
S ,
xI(f
CD(R))y ⇒ xI(f(R))y (1)
and
xP(f
CD(R))y ⇒ xP(f(R))y. (2)
(1) follows immediately from Pareto indiﬀerence. To prove (2), suppose t ∈ N, x,y ∈ X∞
and R ∈R ∞
S are such that
xτI(￿τ)yτ ∀τ<t and xtP(￿t)yt.
If t = 1, let z = y;i ft ≥ 2, let z =( x1,...,x t−1,y≥t). By Pareto indiﬀerence, yI(f(R))z.
Transitivity implies
xf(R)y ⇔ xf(R)z.
Together with the application of multi-proﬁle stationarity t − 1 times and noting that
z≥t = y≥t, we obtain
xf(R)y ⇔ xf(R)z ⇔ x≥tf(R≥t)z≥t ⇔ x≥tf(R≥t)y≥t. (3)
By Theorem 4, the relative ranking of x≥t and y≥t according to R≥t is determined by the
strict preference for x over y according to the ﬁrst generation in the proﬁle R≥t (which
is generation t in R), so that x≥tP(f(R≥t))y≥t and, by (3), xP(f(R))y.
175 Concluding Remarks
In concluding this paper, it may be worthwhile to clarify the relationship between the
multi-proﬁle version of intergenerational social choice theory analyzed in this paper, on
the one hand, and the theory of evaluating inﬁnite intergenerational utility streams, on the
other. The latter theory capitalizes on the Koopmans (1960) analysis of impatience and
the Diamond (1965) impossibility theorem on the existence of continuous social evaluation
orderings on the set of inﬁnite utility streams satisfying the Sidgwick (1907) anonymity
principle and the Pareto principle. Among many contributions that appeared after Di-
amond (1965), those which are most relevant in the present context include Svensson
(1980), Basu and Mitra (2003; 2007), Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2007), Bossert,
Sprumont and Suzumura (2007) and Hara, Shinotsuka, Suzumura and Xu (2008). Al-
though these two lines of inquiry are related in the sense that both are concerned with
aggregating generational evaluations of their well-beings into an overall social evaluation,
they contrast sharply in at least two respects. In the ﬁrst place, the latter investigation is
welfaristic in the sense of basing the overall social evaluation on the inﬁnite-generational
utility streams, whereas the former exercise is free from such an early commitment to this
informational basis. In the second place, while the latter approach hinges squarely on the
continuity assumption even in a vestigial form, the former has nothing to do with any
continuity assumption on social evaluation orderings. More substantially, the Sidgwick
(1907) anonymity principle, which plays a crucial role in establishing the Diamond impos-
sibility theorem and related results, has nothing to do with our impossibility theorems.
Since continuity is a requirement which is rather technical in nature, to get rid of the
dependence on this assumption may be counted as a virtue rather than a vice. Although
the Sidgwick anonymity principle has an obvious intuitive appeal, it is fortunate that we
need not go against this plausible axiom in defending our approach. This principle can
surely be added to the list of axioms but all that is thereby obtained is another set of
Arrow-type impossibility results, some of which will even contain logical redundancies.
References
Arrow, K.J. (1951, second ed. 1963), Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley, New
York.
Asheim, G.B., T. Mitra and B. Tungodden (2007), A new equity condition for inﬁ-
nite utility streams and the possibility of being Paretian, in: J. Roemer and K.
18Suzumura (eds.), Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability, Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke, 55–68.
Basu, K. and T. Mitra (2003), Aggregating inﬁnite utility streams with intergenerational
equity: the impossibility of being Paretian, Econometrica 71, 1557–1563.
Basu, K. and T. Mitra (2007), Utilitarianism for inﬁnite utility streams: a new welfare
criterion and its axiomatic characterization, Journal of Economic Theory 133, 350–
373.
Bossert, W., Y. Sprumont and K. Suzumura (2007), Ordering inﬁnite utility streams,
Journal of Economic Theory 135, 579–589.
Campbell, D.E. (1990), Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle,
Journal of Economic Theory 50, 414–423.
Campbell, D.E. (1992a), Quasitransitive intergenerational social choice for economic
environments, Journal of Mathematical Economics 21, 229–247.
Campbell, D.E. (1992b), Equity, Eﬃciency, and Social Choice, Clarendon, Oxford.
Diamond, P. (1965), The evaluation of inﬁnite utility streams, Econometrica 33, 170–
177.
Ferejohn, J. and T. Page (1978), On the foundations of intertemporal choice, American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 60, 269–275.
Fishburn, P.C. (1970), Arrow’s impossibility theorem: concise proof and inﬁnite voters,
Journal of Economic Theory 2, 103–106.
Hansson, B. (1976), The existence of group preference functions, Public Choice 38,
89–98.
Hara, C., T. Shinotsuka, K. Suzumura and Y. Xu (2008), Continuity and egalitarianism
in the evaluation of inﬁnite utility streams, Social Choice and Welfare 31, 179–191.
Kirman, A.P. and D. Sondermann (1972), Arrow’s theorem, many agents, and invisible
dictators, Journal of Economic Theory 5, 267–277.
Koopmans, T.C. (1960), Stationary ordinal utility and impatience, Econometrica 28,
287–309.
19Packel, E. (1980), Impossibility results in the axiomatic theory of intertemporal choice,
Public Choice 35, 219–227.
Sen, A.K. (1979), Personal utilities and public judgements: or what’s wrong with welfare
economics?, Economic Journal 89, 537–558.
Sen, A.K. (1995), Rationality and social choice, American Economic Review 85, 1–24.
Reprinted in: A.K. Sen (2002), Rationality and Freedom, The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 261–299.
Sidgwick, H. (1907), The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition, Macmillan and Co., London.
Suzumura, K. (2000), Welfare economics beyond welfarist-consequentialism, Japanese
Economic Review 51, 1–32.
Svensson, L.-G. (1980), Equity among generations, Econometrica 48, 1251–1256.
20